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Introduction 
Mutual fund regulation is plagued by conflicting impulses. On the 
one hand, funds are critical investment vehicles that millions of 
Americans depend on for retirement. These Americans have varying 
levels of sophistication and resources, and mutual fund regulation is 
designed to ensure that they are sold products that are appropriate for 
their needs and risk tolerance levels, at a reasonable fee. 
Mutual funds are also, increasingly, a devastatingly powerful 
economic force. As trillions of dollars flows into these vehicles, the asset 
managers who control them exercise tremendous influence over where 
capital flows, how corporations will govern themselves, and what 
priorities corporate managers will pursue. Regulation is therefore 
needed not only to ensure that this power is used to benefit investors 
in the funds, but also to address the very real legitimacy problem that 
arises when private actors are able to exercise such overweening 
authority over resource allocation throughout the economy. 
Unfortunately, the regulations needed to address these two very 
different types of problems are often at cross-purposes. Regulations that 
benefit retirement savers in the short-term may, in the long-term, 
increase asset managers’ power in uncomfortable ways. Asset managers’ 
long-term stewardship over portfolio investments may neglect the 
immediate interests of individual fund beneficiaries. 
 
†  Michael M. Fleishman Associate Professor in Business Law and 
Entrepreneurship, Tulane Law School. 
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This Essay will discuss some of the tensions inherent in mutual fund 
regulatory policy and discuss potential paths forward. 
I. Competition 
The mutual fund has become the most popular vehicle for American 
investment.1 These shell entities permit retail investors to reap the 
benefits of a diversified portfolio under professional management, for a 
fee that is deducted periodically from fund assets. As regulatory changes 
encouraged employers to favor 401(k) plans over traditional pension 
plans,2 retirement assets gradually shifted into mutual funds, and now 
U.S. investment companies hold assets worth $26 trillion.3 Though 
institutions—like pension funds—may also invest in mutual funds, and 
some retail investors purchase shares outside the context of retirement 
planning, mutual funds are also overwhelmingly used as retirement 
vehicles for individual savers.4 
For those who choose to invest in mutual funds, a wide variety of 
options are available. Many mutual funds track an index—namely, a 
sample of companies selected according to some specific criteria, such 
as to mirror the market more generally, or to mirror the performance 
of large cap companies—and the fund (and thus fund investors) pay a 
licensing fee to the index creator.5 Alternatively, for higher fees, 
investors can choose a mutual fund subject to “active” management, 
namely, a bespoke selection of investments chosen by the fund portfolio 
manager.6 These categories—index, or passive, investing, versus active 
investing—are not necessarily all that far apart; though many index 
funds track a broad, widely followed index created by an independent 
entity,7 many indexes are created by affiliates of the mutual fund 
companies themselves according to specific criteria, and are followed by 
only a small number (or even a single) fund.8 
 
1. William A. Birdthistle, Empire of the Fund: The Way We Save 
Now 6 (2016). 
2. See Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder 
Primacy, 43 Seton Hall L. Rev. 909, 930–31 (2013). 
3. Inv. Co. Inst., Investment Company Fact Book, at xii (60th ed. 
2020).  
4. Birdthistle, supra note 1, at 6, 8–9. 
5. See Adriana Z. Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management 
and “Index” Investing, 36 Yale J. on Regul. 795, 847 (2019). 
6. See id. at 802. 
7. See Johannes Petry, Jan Fichtner & Eelke Heemskerk, Steering Capital: 
The Growing Private Authority of Index Providers in the Age of Passive 
Asset Management, 28 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 152, 153 (2019). 
8. Robertson, supra note 5, at 850. 
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Unfortunately, many retail investors purchase shares of funds that 
underperform relative to other available options, whether due to their 
investment selection, fees, or a combination of both. Multiple funds 
track the exact same index, differing, in practical effect, only in the fees 
charged.9 Active funds, or bespoke indexes, may not be any better. 
Frequently, they charge high fees that erode into investment returns, 
and cannot consistently outperform the cheaper passive funds that 
follow a broad segment of the market.10 Retail investors may find 
themselves investing in funds that take on too much risk relative to 
their needs, and as a result see the value of their investment collapse 
just when they need it for retirement.11 Funds may bill themselves as 
following particularly strategies—such as “sustainability” or “ESG” or 
value or growth—but the fine print demonstrates that the proposed 
strategy does not match the funds’ investments or its voting and 
engagement behavior.12 
In a functioning market, competition would eliminate these high-
fee, underperforming funds. And to some extent, that has happened; 
fees have dropped overall,13 and investors have dramatically reallocated 
their dollars from active to passive funds in the past several years 
(which probably explains the proliferation of purported “index” funds 
that appear to reallocate what would otherwise be management fees 
into index licensing fees).14 Yet problems in the market persist, in large 
part because many retail investors are either unsophisticated about 
their options, or cannot afford the search costs associated with 
identifying more suitable choices.15 
 
9. See Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence and Control: 
Retirement Savings and the Limits of Soft Paternalism, 6 Wm. & Mary 
Bus. L. Rev. 35, 62 (2015); Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital 
Allocation, 78 Ohio St. L.J. 181, 199 (2017); Birdthistle, supra note 
1, at 78. 
10. Birdthistle, supra note 1, at 26–27. 
11. Id. at 168–70. 
12. See Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne Tucker, Buyer Beware: Variation and 
Opacity in ESG and ESG Index Funds, 41 Cardozo L. Rev. 1921, 1926 
(2020); Huaizhi Chen, Lauren Cohen & Umit Gurun, Don’t Take Their 
Word for It: The Misclassification of Bond Mutual Funds 1–4 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26423, 2020), https://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3474557 [https://perma.cc/4LK 
U-ST2M]. 
13. Inv. Co. Inst., supra note 3, at 118. 
14. Robertson, supra note 5, at 843. 
15. John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why 
Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 Yale 
L.J. 84, 114 (2010). 
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Retail investors’ lack of sophistication has been extensively 
documented.16 Investors have trouble understanding fee disclosures, and 
basic financial concepts such as the value of diversification.17 They 
frequently chase past performance as representative of future returns.18 
Those who invest exclusively through a 401(k) plan are even less 
sophisticated than investors as a whole, and less capable of making 
prudent financial judgments.19 Mutual fund sponsors are aware of these 
problems and can exploit them by targeting the most expensive funds 
to the least sophisticated investors.20 The result is that the market’s 
invisible hand is not sufficient to weed out the more predatory funds 
and asset managers.21 
There are a number of potential solutions to this problem. For 
starters, funds and fund sponsors could be more tightly regulated. 
Greater restrictions could be placed on fees, rather than the relatively 
light-touch approach that exists now.22 Funds that follow broad indices 
could come with disclosure requirements comparing their fees to similar 
 
16. See Jill E. Fisch, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Kristin Firth, The Knowledge 
Gap in Workplace Retirement Investing and the Role of Professional 
Advisors, 66 Duke L.J. 633, 634 (2016); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Securities 
Law Implications of Financial Illiteracy, 104 Va. L. Rev. 1065, 1089 (2018); 
Edwards, supra note 9, at 193–95. 
17. Fairfax, supra note 16, at 1083; Jill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why 
Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes? An Experiment on Mutual Fund 
Choice, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 605, 643–44 (2014). 
18. Quinn Curtis, The Fiduciary Rule Controversy and the Future of 
Investment Advice, 9 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 53, 61 (2019); Itzhak Ben-David, 
Francesco Franzoni, Byungwook Kim & Rabih Moussawi, Competition for 
Attention in the ETF Space 8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper 
No. 28369, 2021), https://www.nber.org/papers/w28369 [https://perma.cc 
/7ARP-JJY2]. 
19. Jill E. Fisch, Annamaria Lusardi & Andrea Hasler, Defined Contribution 
Plans and the Challenge of Financial Illiteracy, 105 Cornell L. Rev. 741, 
742 (2020). 
20. Birdthistle, supra note 1, at 77; see also Curtis, supra note 18, at 61–62; 
Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in 
Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of 
Investor Sovereignty, 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 1017, 1033 (2005); Morley & 
Curtis, supra note 15, at 130. 
21. Allen Ferrell & John Morley, New Special Study of the Securities Markets: 
Institutional Intermediaries 8 (Yale L. & Econ., Rsch. Paper No. 580, 2017) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3005542 [https://pe 
rma.cc/LA9B-ZJA7]. 
22. See Morley & Curtis, supra note 15, at 136–40 (discussing the flaws with 
the current liability regime for excessive fees and suggesting that price 
regulation would be more effective); Birdthistle, supra note 1, at 80–88 
(discussing problems with permitted mutual fund fees). 
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funds.23 Fiduciary obligations could be placed on index providers who 
create bespoke indexes or modify their indexes after consultation with 
the funds they serve.24 Regulators could restrict retail investors’ ability 
to invest in more esoteric funds, with licensing or sophistication require–
ments,25 not unlike current standards that limit certain investments 
only to wealthy and sophisticated buyers.26 
Alternatively, there could be more robust regulation of sales 
channels. Currently, funds may be sold through brokers, registered 
investment advisers, or dual-registered entities, and varying degrees of 
fiduciary responsibility are placed on each.27 Brokers and dual-
registered entities in particular may operate under conflicts that 
discourage them from offering the cheapest and most appropriate 
products to their customers.28 These conflicts could be regulated more 
tightly, and reforms could be made to the commission structures to 
discourage sales of subpar funds.29 
Many funds are offered as options in a menu of choices provided by 
an employer as part of a 401(k) plan, and though certain fiduciary 
obligations attach to employers when constructing these menus, these 
are quite minimal.30 Some progress has been made inducing lower fee 
 
23. Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1961, 2030–31 (2010). 
24. See Paul G. Mahoney & Adriana Z. Robertson, Advisers by Another Name 
44 (Va. L. & Econ., Rsch. Paper No. 2021-01, 2021), https://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3767087 [https://perma.cc/8LDB-
TKDS]. 
25. See Birdthistle, supra note 1, at 207–08; Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, 
Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees and 
“Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 Yale L.J. 1476, 1525–26 (2015). 
The SEC briefly floated the idea of requiring brokers and investment 
advisers to assess their clients’ level of sophistication before selling them 
certain types of funds, but dropped the proposal upon industry pushback. 
See Justin Baer & Paul Kiernan, Leveraged-ETF Seller Urges Investors to 
Fight Proposed Regulation, Wall St. J. (Jan. 30, 2020, 8:28 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/leveraged-etf-seller-urges-investors-to-fight-
proposed-regulation-11580390914 [https://perma.cc/P3NK-WTQT]. 
26. Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 
3389, 3395 (2013). 
27. See Nicole M. Boyson, The Worst of Both Worlds? Dual-Registered 
Investment Advisers 1 (Ne. U. D’Amore-McKim Sch. Of Bus., Rsch. Paper 
No. 3360537, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=3360537 [https://perma.cc/U4VS-D5HF]; Curtis, supra note 18, at 59. 
28. Boyson, supra note 27, at 3; see Curtis, supra note 18, at 56. 
29. Curtis, supra note 18, at 87. 
30. Fisch, et al., supra note 19, at 754–57. 
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options in 401(k) plans,31 but there still may be far too many choices 
for investors to reasonably parse.32 
There are likely many reasons we have not adopted these 
measures—including, but not limited to, legal roadblocks33 and the 
lobbying power of the financial industry,34—but at least one issue 
concerns the inescapable reality that for most retail investors, there 
should not be many investment options at all. Most retail investors 
would do best with a passive fund that rebalances to limit risk as their 
retirement date nears.35 In fact, when the Obama administration 
proposed stronger fiduciary obligations for brokers, one of the main 
objections was that the rules would, as a practical matter, require 
brokers to sell the same limited set of products to all clients.36 
That said, however optimal a cheap, simple, passive strategy may 
be for retail investors, the curtailment of investors’ choices would result 
in an extraordinary concentration within the asset management 
industry. There is no need to have multiple competing complexes if 
most investors are following a limited set of broad market indexes; 
indeed, William Birdthistle proposed that a single asset manager, 
 
31. Curtis, supra note 18, at 91. 
32. Fisch, et al., supra note 19, at 755–57. 
33. See Chamber of Com. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 885 F.3d 360, 388 (5th Cir. 
2018). 
34. Ben McLannahan & Alistair Gray, Lobbyists Prepare New Fight to Reverse 
US Fiduciary Rule, Fin. Times (May 23, 2017), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/3dd4ad40-3ff5-11e7-9d56-25f963e998b2 [https://perma.cc/L5LQ-P 
J3Y]. 
35. Curtis, supra note 18, at 96. 
36. See, e.g., Andrew Ackerman & Karen Damato, Obama Backs New Rules for 
Brokers on Retirement Accounts, Wall St. J. (Feb. 23, 2015, 6:39 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-to-back-new-rules-for-brokers-on-retir 
ement-accounts-1424689201 [https://perma.cc/R9ST-LXKK] (“Wall Street 
groups warn the rules could crimp investors’ choices by limiting the range of 
retirement products brokers can pitch . . . .”); Anthony Scaramucci, Your 
401(k) Doesn’t Need a Federal Babysitter, Wall St. J. (Nov. 2, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/your-401-k-doesnt-need-a-federal-babysitter-
1478042244 [https://perma.cc/M3HB-TGJ8] (warning the rules will “[p]ush 
investors excessively into passive index funds”); Michael Wursthorn, Watch 
Out, Retirement Savers, Your Choices Are Poised to Shrink, Wall St. J. 
(Aug. 18, 2016, 6:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/watch-out-retire 
ment-savers-your-choices-are-poised-to-shrink-1471560128 [https://perma.cc 
/2VNB-NBD6] (“Some clients will see their investment options diminished 
or face the prospect of higher fees.”); Reactions to the Labor Department’s 
Fiduciary Rule, Wall St. J. (Apr. 6, 2016, 6:12 PM), https://www.wsj. 
com/articles/reactions-to-the-labor-departments-fiduciary-rule-1459954904 
[https://perma.cc/5NEV-ZBPB] (“It will encourage more money to flow into 
passives, ETFs and low-cost funds, which is not good for traditional asset 
management profitability.”). 
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BlackRock, handle all of America’s retirement plans.37 That presents a 
problem not only for the industry itself, but also for all of corporate 
America: through its mutual funds, a single financial institution would 
control a sizeable equity stake in every U.S. publicly traded company. 
The power and influence represented by holdings of that size would 
present a significant economic and political problem: It would allow a 
single, private actor to set the agenda for a massive swath of the 
economy. 
To be sure, that concentration is already occurring. In the past 
decade, “[t]he share of assets managed by the five largest firms rose 
from 35 percent at year-end 2005 to 53 percent at year-end 2019, and 
the share managed by the 10 largest firms increased from 46 percent to 
64 percent.”38 The three largest index fund managers, BlackRock, 
Vanguard, and State Street, together constitute the largest investor in 
88% of the S&P 500,39 with holdings averaging at around 22% per 
company, up from 13.5% in 2008.40 Nearly a third of the companies in 
the S&P 500 have four or fewer shareholders holding roughly 20% of 
their stock.41 The growth and consolidation of the industry has resulted 
in “a concentration of corporate ownership, not seen since the days of 
J.P. Morgan and J.D. Rockefeller.”42 
Numerous commenters have sounded the alarm over the political 
power exercised by this kind of concentration of equity ownership 
among a very small number of financial institutions.43 That concern is 
part of a long American tradition of distrusting—and regulating to 
 
37. Birdthistle, supra note 1, at 213–14. 
38. Inv. Co. Inst., supra note 3, at 46. 
39. Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden 
Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-concentration of 
Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 Bus. & Pol. 298, 313 
(2017). 
40. David McLaughlin & Annie Massa, The Hidden Dangers of the Great 




41. John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The 
Problem of Twelve 13 (Harvard Pub. L., Working Paper No. 19-07, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247337 [https:// 
perma.cc/9NZG-T8Y6]. 
42. Fichtner et al., supra note 39, at 315. 
43. Coates, supra note 41, at 2; Fichtner et al., supra note 39, at 319; cf. 
Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate 
Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 2029, 
2128–29 (2019) (recognizing the “policy concerns” raised by the “growing 
concentration of equity in the hands of three large players”). 
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prevent—concentrated financial power.44 Additionally, some voices 
have objected to the popularity of index investing in general, concerned 
that it contributes to market inefficiencies.45 Further attempts to limit 
mutual fund options would only exacerbate these problems. 
In other words, we have a paradox in that the regulatory strategies 
that would most benefit America’s retirees would not be optimal for 
markets—or the economy—as a whole. And so competition is 
maintained in the industry, which ultimately impedes efforts to improve 
outcomes for individual savers. 
II. Coordination 
If one part of the regulatory apparatus encourages competition, 
other parts encourage cooperation—specifically, cooperation among 
funds within a single complex. 
Corporate theory has long grappled with the problem of how to 
address agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and 
control.46 In any company where the equity owners hire professional 
managers, there is a risk that the managers will either shirk their 
responsibilities or generally act to advance their own interests rather 
than the owners’.47 Yet if the circle of ownership is small, and each 
owner has a large stake, they presumably will be able to oversee the 
managers’ performance and discipline them for straying from the 
owners’ interests. In a public company, however, that oversight is 
lessened. Dispersed shareholders may not individually have large 
enough stakes to justify the expense of close oversight; as a result, there 
 
44. Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political 
Roots of American Corporate Finance, at xiv–xv (1994); Coates, 
supra note 41, at 2–3; see Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Index Funds 
and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders Be Shareholders, 100 B.U. 
L. Rev. 1771, 1798 (2020) (recognizing that “BlackRock faces political 
risk” from the “historical suspicion of concentrated economic power in the 
United States”). 
45. E.g., Alicia McElhaney, Is Passive Investing Making Markets Dumb?, 
Inst’l Inv. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/arti 
cle/b1b0glsqj5j134/Is-Passive-Investing-Making-Markets-Dumb [https:// 
perma.cc/LZ9E-JBU4]; Vladyslav Sushko & Grant Turner, The Implica–
tions of Passive Investing for Securities Markets, BIS Q. Rev., Mar. 
2018, at 113, 119, https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1803j.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/6XB8-2PDW]; Luke Kawa, Bernstein: Passive Investing Is 




46. Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. 
Corp. L. 493, 498–99 (2018). 
47. See Coates, supra note 41, at 17 . 
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is a greater risk of managerial faithlessness.48 Corporate law and 
securities regulation have been amended and retheorized repeatedly 
over the past several decades to find new solutions to this problem, 
including placing greater disclosure obligations on public companies (to 
lower the costs of shareholder monitoring),49 and loosening restrictions 
on shareholder cooperation (to overcome some of the collective action 
costs).50 
The rise of institutional shareholders has been a source of hope to 
both regulators and theorists alike as a potential solution to 
shareholders’ collective action problem. Institutions, the theory goes, 
have large enough stakes to make it worthwhile to monitor their 
portfolio companies; meanwhile, professionalized management ensures 
they have the skills to do so.51 
The difficulty is that institutional shareholders are not a monolith. 
Many are asset managers that sponsor hundreds of funds, each of which 
holds a different, diversified portfolio.52 The asset manager earns fees in 
the form of a percentage of assets under management; thus, as asset 
size increases, so does the size of the fee.53 Though this would nominally 
suggest that the asset managers have an interest in exercising oversight 
over portfolio companies so as to increase their value (and thus the 
value of the fund, and fees to the manager), in fact, when viewed on a 
fund-by-fund basis, each fund’s holdings may not be large enough to 
justify the kind of oversight that many theorists seem to want. 
As a result, the expectation has been for cooperation over 
competition, at least when it comes to stewardship over investments.54 
 
48. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional 
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 811, 821 (1992). 
49. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United 
States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 
Stan. L. Rev. 1465, 1548 (2007). 
50. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of 
Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. Corp. L. 545, 
559–60 (2016). 
51. Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Staff Report on 
Corporate Accountability: A Re-Examination of Rules Relating 
to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in 
the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance 
Generally 383 (1980); Black, supra note 48, at 831; Ronald J. Gilson & 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Reevaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 
863, 867 (2013). 
52. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 43, at 2050. 
53. Kahan & Rock, supra note 44, at 1782. 
54. Numerous academics have extolled the promise of institutional shareholder 
monitoring, often assuming that incentives arise from holdings across the 
entire family, rather than on a fund-by-fund basis. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, 
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Even though each mutual fund is a separate entity with a distinct 
portfolio, most advisors centralize voting behavior.55 The largest asset 
managers—which not only manage mutual funds, but also hedge funds 
and other kinds of accounts—may also include these entities within 
their voting policy.56 Though some fund families may give individual 
portfolio managers greater or lesser freedom to go their own way, others 
may be quite strict about requiring adherence to the family line.57 
Advocates see benefits to encouraging families to pool their votes 
as though all of their holdings were part of a single portfolio. When the 
entire portfolio is collectivized in this way, the apparent incentives to 
exercise oversight over each company—whose shares may be held in 
multiple funds—is far greater.58 Moreover, across fund families, asset 
managers’ fortunes are tied to the economy as a whole, thus they may 
have an interest in promoting corporate governance changes that 
benefit society overall.59 For example, large, diversified investors may 
 
supra note 44, at 1785; Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 43, at 2046, 2050, 2080; 
See generally Asaf Eckstein, The Virtue of Common Ownership in an Era 
of Corporate Compliance, 105 Iowa L. Rev. 507 (2020)(arguing that large 
asset managers are well-incentivized and positioned to ensure their portfolio 
firms comply with the law). 
55. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 43, at 2064. 
56. John D. Morley, Too Big to Be Activist, 92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1407, 1421–
22 (2019); Ann M. Lipton, Family Loyalty: Mutual Fund Voting and 
Fiduciary Obligation, 19 Transactions: Tenn. J. Bus. L. 175, 187–89 
(2017); Fichtner et al., supra note 39, at 316–17. 
57. Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S. Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in 
Corporate Law, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 1151, 1171 (2019); Morley, supra note 56, 
at 1421–22; Asaf Eckstein, The Push Toward Corporate Guidelines 18–19 
(Oct. 5, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3705140 [https://perma.cc/SL3H-VZVM]. 
 Vanguard and Fidelity have separately delegated voting authority for the 
passive and active funds, apparently to avoid aggregation under Section 
13(d) of the Exchange Act. See Thomas Franck, Vanguard to Surrender 
Some of Its Corporate Voting Power to External Fund Managers, CNBC 
(Apr. 25, 2019, 2:26 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/25/vanguard-
to-give-up-some-of-its-voting-power-to-external-fund-managers.html [https: 
//perma.cc/8WKN-SS3Z]; Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Who 
Calls the Shots? How Mutual Funds Vote on Director Elections, 3 Harv. 
Bus. L. Rev. 35, 49 (2013); see also Morley, supra note 56, at 1423–30. 
58. Kahan & Rock, supra note 44, at 1785–88. 
59. John C. Coffee, The Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common Ownership, and 
Systematic Risk 43 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 
541/2020, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3678197 [https://perma.cc/6XXR-345P]; Jim Hawley & Jon Lukomnik, 
The Long and Short of It: Are We Asking the Right Questions? Modern 
Portfolio Theory and Time Horizons, 41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 449, 450 
(2018). 
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want to reduce carbon emissions because climate change damages their 
entire portfolio.60 In the wake of the Black Lives Matter movement, 
large mutual fund families publicly announced they would monitor their 
portfolio investments’ commitment to diversity.61 These may have been 
public relations moves, but they also may have reflected an 
understanding that racial discrimination harms the economy,62 and thus 
harms diversified investors. 
The downside to this kind of coordination is that because funds 
have different mixes of investments, they may not always have the same 
interests. Though a simplistic view of corporate governance posits that 
each firm must simply maximize its individual wealth—and each 
investor will vote to advance that goal—in fact, a portfolio holder may 
find that wealth maximization at an individual company does not equal 
wealth maximization at the fund level. For example, portfolios that 
include both stock and debt in a single company may vote the stock in 
a way that maximizes the value of the debt, while pure stockholders 
would choose a different strategy.63 A fund might rationally vote to 
encourage an oil company to reduce carbon emissions—even at the 
expense of the oil company’s profits—if the specter of climate change 
was damaging other investments in the portfolio.64 But that means that 
a nondiversified energy fund might prefer that the oil company 
 
60. Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 Wash. L. 
Rev. 1, 4–6 (2020). 
61. Billy Nauman, US Investors Demand Data in Fight Against Racial 
Discrimination, Fin. Times (July 27, 2020), https://www.ft.com/con 
tent/1dffac98-fd4e-4288-8683-8f84e236d335 [https://perma.cc/UYV4-FP 
JJ]; Billy Nauman, State Street to Insist Companies Disclose Diversity 
Data, Fin. Times (Jan. 10, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/2e512c76-
4733-4821-8425-136ab9b98426 [https://perma.cc/T3PJ-WPUR]. 
62. See Adedayo Akala, Cost Of Racism: U.S. Economy Lost $16 Trillion 
Because of Discrimination, Bank Says, NPR (Sept. 23, 2020, 2:42 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020 
/09/23/916022472/cost-of-racism-u-s-economy-lost-16-trillion-because-of-di 
scrimination-bank-says [https://perma.cc/Y3YS-LRT8]; Steve Matthews & 
Catarina Saraiva, Fed Finds Race, Gender Disparities Cut U.S. GDP by 
$2.6 Trillion, Bloomberg (Feb. 2, 2021, 11:32 AM), https://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-02/fed-finds-race-gender-disparities-
cut-u-s-gdp-by-2-6-trillion [https://perma.cc/R85R-YCMY]. 
63. Lipton, supra note 56, at 190; see also Tao Chen, Li Zhang & Qifei Zhu, 
Dual Ownership and Risk-taking Incentives in Managerial Compensation 1 
(July 26, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3427030 [https://perma.cc/LBG4-3TM3]; Aneel 
Keswani, Anh Tran & Paolo Volpin, Institutional Debt Holder Governance 
28–29 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 613/2019, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3282394 [https://pe 
rma.cc/XM8V-DRRT]. 
64. Condon, supra note 60, at 5–6. 
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maximize its profits, and treating all of the funds as though they were 
part of one portfolio elides these differences.65 The more that fund 
families sponsor niche funds, the more these differences are exacerbated. 
For example, sustainability funds sponsored by large index providers 
like BlackRock and Vanguard, apparently vote against environmental 
and social proposals when it is in the interests of the fund family to do 
so.66  
In other words, vote coordination may allow institutional share–
holders to fulfill their promise as corporate stewards, but just as 
breaking funds up into competitive families sacrifices the interests of 
retail investors in favor of a broader economic plan, allowing funds to 
coordinate their votes to benefit the economy sacrifices the interests of 
investors who may only hold shares in a single fund.67 
To be sure, it may be perfectly reasonable for individual portfolio 
managers, acting in the interests of a particular fund, to direct the fund 
to vote its shares with the family. Votes are only valuable en masse; it 
may be rational for a fund to “sacrifice” its interests on certain votes 
in order to receive the benefits of speaking with a single voice on other 
 
65. Lipton, supra note 56, at 190; Griffith & Lund, supra note 57, at 1182–86; 
Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of 
Mutual Fund Voting Authority, 98 Tex. L. Rev. 983, 1013–14 (2020); 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of 
Institutional Investors, 31 J. Econ. Persps. 89, 99 (2017) (“[T]he fact that 
a given actively managed fund is overweight in a particular corporation 
might be offset by the fact that other actively managed funds within the 
same fund family might be underweight. The investment manager of the 
fund family will have an incentive to bring about an increase in value only 
if its actively managed funds are on the whole overweight in this corporation 
. . . .”); Morley, supra note 56, at 1439–41. 
66. See Roni Michaely, Guillem Ordonez-Calafi, & Silvina Rubio, ES Votes that 
Matter, (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper, Paper No. 
774/2021, 2021) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=38 
84917 [https://perma.cc/7XVT-P89B]. 
67. Vanguard’s structure could—but in practical effect does not—break the 
mold. As described above, Vanguard, like all asset managers, collects fees 
based on the size of its funds; its incentives to oversee portfolio companies 
therefore arise, in large part, from the fact that if its funds increase in 
value, Vanguard’s fees increase as well. Unusually, however, the Vanguard 
asset manager is owned by its funds; thus, theoretically, each fund benefits 
when Vanguard itself benefits, giving each fund an (indirect) stake in the 
performance of the other funds in the family. John Morley, The Separation 
of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and 
Regulation, 123 Yale L.J. 1228, 1276 (2014). But Vanguard uses a set of 
contractual devices to eliminate each fund’s claim on the residual earnings 
of the management company. Id. at 1276–77. Thus, though on the surface 
each of Vanguard’s funds might seem to have an interest in the success of 
the others, Vanguard has chosen to eliminate that shared interest. 
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matters.68 The difficulty is that there is little reason to believe fund 
managers are in fact conducting that level of analysis; voting policy 
within a family is dictated from the top down. 
Oddly, although this practice arguably violates funds’ fiduciary 
duties under federal and state law,69 it has not (yet) been the focus of 
regulatory attention.70 Eventually, however, regulators will have to 
determine what funds’ obligations are with respect to vote pooling. 
Their policy choices will reflect their view of the proper balance between 
using mutual fund complexes as a tool to oversee the economy, versus 
their immediate obligations to retail clients. 
But if the regulatory system encourages the proliferation of funds 
out of a distrust of concentrated economic power, the problem is simply 
reproduced when massive fund families are permitted to coordinate 
their voting behavior. Indeed, the real-world effects of this concentrated 
power may already be exhibiting themselves; several researchers have 
argued that when a fund family takes large stakes in firms in the same 
industry, competition between the firms is lessened, to the detriment of 
other stakeholders.71 
One solution, proposed by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst, would 
be to limit the holdings of mutual fund families to 5% of a given 
company’s stock, which, they argue, is enough to provide incentives for 
oversight but not so high an amount as to create undue economic 
 
68. Lipton, supra note 56, at 196–97. 
69. See id. at 192–95. 
70. But see Elad L. Roisman, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote 
Remarks: ICI Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference 
(Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-roisman-031819 
[https://perma.cc/657M-57WG] (expressing the SEC commissioner’s con–
cern about centralized voting). 
71. Martin C. Schmalz, Common-Ownership Concentration and Corporate 
Conduct 9 (CESifo Working Paper No. 6908, 2018), https://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3046829 [https://perma.cc/JC5T-AS 
33]; Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1267, 1279 
(2016); Miguel Antón, Florian Ederer, Mireia Giné & Martin C. Schmalz, 
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives 1 (Eur. 
Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 511/2017, 2021) https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802332 [https://perma.cc/ 
NJR9-Q96Y]; Jose Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive 
Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. Fin. 1513 (2018); see also Zohar 
Goshen & Doran Levit, Common Ownership and the Decline of the 
American Worker, (Columbia L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 653, 2021) 
(arguing that concentration of ownership among a small number of large 
mutual fund families contributes to wage stagnation) https://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3832069 [https://perma.cc/UJ5M-6Q8 
K]. 
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concentration.72 This, again, though, might encourage the fracturing of 
the mutual fund industry, with the dysfunction that follows. 
Meanwhile, Eric Posner, Fiona Morton, and E. Glen Weyl contend that 
mutual funds’ outsized power over the economy is tied to their 
diversification, and therefore fund families should be limited in their 
ability to own stocks in competing companies.73 That might encourage 
improved corporate oversight74 but not only would further encourage 
market fracturing among mutual fund complexes,75 it may also worsen 
outcomes for the retail shareholders who would bear less diversified risk. 
III. Regulatory Misfires 
Rather than move in these directions, regulators have sought to 
disrupt shareholder coordination by targeting all investors generally 
rather than mutual funds specifically. For example, a recent bete noir 
of companies chafing under investor oversight has been the proxy 
advisor system. Proxy advisors, like ISS and Glass-Lewis, analyze the 
myriad issues that appear on corporate proxy ballots, and issue reports 
to institutional investors offering commentary and voting recommen–
dations.76 Through this process, proxy advisors make it easier for 
shareholders to coordinate their votes and express coherent preferences. 
Though many have accused institutional investors of blindly following 
proxy advisors’ recommendations,77 the matter is not so simple: ISS and 
Glass-Lewis tailor their recommendations to the preferences of large 
institutions,78 and may serve more of an “agenda-setting” function by 
 
72. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 43, at 2129; see also Goshen & Levit, supra 
note 71 (recommending limits on assets under management). 
73. Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to 
Limit the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 Antitrust 
L.J. 669, 672, 724 (2017). 
74. Depending, of course, of one’s definition of improved, eliminating common 
ownership might eliminate incentives to reduce systemic risk, see supra 
notes 72–73 and accompanying text, or industry-wide compliance risk, see 
Asaf Eckstein, supra note 54, at 511–12. 
75. Their proposal would make exceptions for some “pure” index funds that 
remained entirely passive, and for families that limited the size of their 
holdings, which presumably would encourage a proliferation of families. 
76. Andrew F. Tuch, Proxy Advisor Influence in a Comparative Light, 99 
B.U. L. Rev. 1459, 1464 (2019). 
77. E.g., Paul Rose, Robovoting and Proxy Vote Disclosure 1 (Nov. 26, 2019) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs 
tract_id=3486322 [https://perma.cc/W9SQ-Y8S3]. 
78. Asaf Eckstein, The Push Toward Corporate Guidelines 58 (Oct. 14, 2020) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs 
tract_id=3705140 [https://perma.cc/HPB7-GSK5]; Stephen Choi, Jill 
Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 
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identifying key matters in what would otherwise be a cacophony of 
issues that are presented to shareholders every year.79 
In recognition of proxy advisors’ rising influence, the SEC recently 
proposed rules that would have required, among other things, that 
proxy advisors distribute drafts of their reports to issuing companies 
for their comment before sending them to investors.80 These rules would 
have made it far more expensive for proxy advisors to operate, and 
incentivized them toward recommending that shareholders vote with 
management.81 The final rules are less draconian; among other things, 
they only require that issuers be given a copy of the report at the same 
time that it is distributed to investors, and that the proxy advisor send 
its clients hyperlinks to any issuer responses.82 But additional SEC 
guidance warning institutional investors of their duty to review issuer 
responses before casting a ballot may disrupt or burden the voting 
process.83 
Rule 14a-8 is another mechanism by which shareholders coordinate 
with each other and express preferences about how corporations should 
be run.84 Rule 14a-8 allows shareholders to include proposals on the 
corporate proxy ballot for other shareholders to vote on. They are 
typically used to advocate for particular governance arrangements—
such as destaggered boards, the separation of the chair and CEO roles, 
and so forth—or to request that the company engage on social and 
 
59 Emory L.J. 869, 883 (2010); Chong Shu, The Proxy Advisory Industry: 
Influencing and Being Influenced 3–4, (Dec. 22, 2020) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=36143 
14 [https://perma.cc/3E4Q-WN2Q]. 
79. Douglas Sarro, Proxy Advisors as Issue Spotters, 15 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. 
& Com. L. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 3), available at https://pap 
ers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3699227 [https://perma.cc/R4 
VW-L8HG]. 
80. Amendments to Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting 
Advice, 84 Fed. Reg. 66,518 (proposed Dec. 4, 2019) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 240). 
81. Robert J. Jackson Jr., Statement on Proposals to Restrict Shareholder 
Voting, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/ 
public-statement/statement-jackson-2019-11-05-open-meeting [https://per 
ma.cc/AJ9X-GXJQ] (calling the proposal a “tax” on “anti-management 
advice”). 
82. Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice, 85 Fed. Reg. 
55,082, 55,110 & n.346 (Sept. 3, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
83. See Supplement to Commission Guidance Regarding Proxy Voting 
Responsibilities of Investment Advisers, 85 Fed. Reg. 55,155, 55,157 (Sept. 
3, 2020). 
84. Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020). 
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environmental issues, such as being more transparent about political 
spending or workforce diversity and pay disparities.85 
Shareholder proposals are influential not just at the targeted 
corporation, but also at a wide swath of companies, because a favorable 
vote on a particular proposal sends a signal to other corporations as to 
what shareholders demand. The votes also allow shareholders to see 
what other shareholders are thinking and learn from it. Merely putting 
a proposal on the ballot allows ISS and Glass-Lewis to comment on the 
proposal, which makes it easier for shareholders to form their own 
judgments. Through shareholder proposals, markets can come to 
consensus about various corporate reforms. 
In a recent rulemaking, the SEC dramatically restricted 
shareholders’ ability to use Rule 14a-8, imposing much higher owner–
ship thresholds before shareholders can offer a proposal, and limiting 
shareholders’ ability to re-propose failed proposals in successive years.86 
These changes may be rolled back by the Biden Administration, but 
assuming they take effect, they would limit investors’ ability to 
coordinate with each other and exercise control over their portfolio 
companies. 
The ironic side effect of these actions, though, will likely be to 
enhance the power of the largest mutual fund families while minimizing 
the power of other shareholders. So long as the largest families 
coordinate their voting behavior across their funds, they do not need to 
use the proposal process to communicate their desires to management; 
they simply need to make a phone call.87 They have sufficient in-house 
resources to determine their corporate governance preferences without 
 
85. E.g., Philip Stamatakos & Joel May, How to Respond to Shareholder 
Proposals Seeking Board Declassification, Deal Laws., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 
1 (discussing board de-staggering); Craig McGuire, What is a Shareholder 
Proposal?, S’holder Activist, http://theshareholderactivist.com/share 
holder-activism-spotlight/what-is-a-shareholder-proposal/ [https://perma.cc 
/KBF7-ZLM6] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021) (“Some typical uses of 
shareholder proposals are to address issues with management compensation, 
change shareholder voting rights, focus on a policy related to a social or 
environmental issue, or to advocate for corporate charitable contributions.”). 
86. Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds Under Exchange 
Act Rule 14a-8, 85 Fed. Reg. 70,240 (Nov. 4, 2020) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 240). 
87. See Brandon Rees, Deputy Dir. Corps. & Cap. Mkts., Am. Fed’n of Lab. 
and Cong. Indus. Orgs., Security and Exchange Commission Round Table 
on the Proxy Process 150:8–16 (Nov. 15, 2018) (“Large institutional 
investors—the Blackrocks and State Streets and Vanguards of the world—
do not need the shareholder proposal rule process to get the attention of 
management or the board of directors. There’s not a corporate secretary or 
investor relations department in the country that would not return their 
call within 24 hours.”). 
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relying as heavily on proxy advisors,88 and they can coordinate 
preferences in private conferences with other large investors.89 
If Rule 14a-8 proposals are rarer, that only means that the very 
largest asset managers will not be forced to take public positions on 
matters of corporate governance, while still maintaining their ability to 
influence corporate managers in private. They are not obligated to 
disclose voting policies on matters that never come up for a vote. If it 
becomes harder or more expensive for ISS and Glass-Lewis to operate, 
the coordination costs will be felt by the smaller shareholders who rely 
more on their counsel, leaving it to the giants alone to influence 
corporate policy. 
In other words, moves targeted at disrupting shareholder 
coordination will have the ironic effect of increasing the influence of the 
largest asset managers, and reducing their transparency and account–
ability to the public. 
IV.  A Balancing Act 
There may be no obvious way out of this dilemma, in a world where 
we both encourage, and discourage, the enormous accumulation of 
capital. Asset managers need to be just disaggregated enough not to 
represent a political threat, but not so disaggregated that predatory 
funds proliferate and their ability to exercise oversight over portfolio 
companies is undermined. Improvement in one direction causes 
deterioration in another. 
At least one possibility is to recognize, and remedy, the fact that 
America is uniquely reliant on private savings to protect people in 
retirement. Many countries have a more robust public retirement 
system to serve as a safety net; American Social Security benefits are 
stingy by comparison.90 That puts enormous pressure on private savings 
to provide basic needs that are uniform across most of the population. 
If these needs were met via government benefits, there really would be 
an appropriate market, targeted to wealthier beneficiaries, for tailored 
and varied private retirement options. This class of savers might also 
be sophisticated enough to avoid more predatory plans.91 Redirecting 
savings from private actors to a government plan might also lessen the 
power of the investment giants, which would satisfy political concerns, 
while possibly leaving them still large enough to engage in effective 
stewardship over portfolio companies. Moreover, if the power of these 
 
88. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 43, at 2078. 
89. Coates, supra note 41, at 15. 
90. See generally Mercer & CFA Inst., Glob. Pension Index 8 (2020) 
(assigning grades to various systems throughout the world). 
91. Cf. Fisch et al., supra note 19, at 743–44 (noting that involuntary workplace 
investors, by contrast, are not sophisticated enough to avoid more predatory 
plans). 
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giants is lessened by redirecting a portion of what is now private savings 
into a government pension, there might be less discomfort with stronger 
regulation that functionally eliminates the more predatory funds and 
families entirely. 
There may also be regulatory mechanisms to balance the competing 
goals of preserving fund families’ oversight capabilities, minimizing 
their political power, and protecting the distinct interests of investors 
in each fund. 
One option is, in a sense, architectural: regulators could mute, but 
not eliminate, the families’ influence by introducing friction into the 
coordination process. For example, the legal rule could be that families 
are obligated to vote each fund’s shares in the best interests of that 
fund, and that each fund manager must be given the freedom to vote 
independently of other funds in the family. Then, some degree of 
documentation could be required to demonstrate that any coordination 
among funds’ votes was reviewed by each fund board to ensure that the 
interests of each fund were protected. The substantive goal would be 
to ensure that when votes are pooled, it is done because that is in the 
best interests of each fund individual, and to permit the possibility of 
divergent votes, so as to blunt families’ voting power. At the same time, 
however, the paperwork obligations alone could deter funds from 
pooling votes on minor matters, while still being worth the price for the 
more significant votes. Thus, in real ways, the influence of mutual fund 
families could be mitigated while still preserving their ability to act as 
corporate stewards overall. 
The introduction of administrative friction into the decisionmaking 
process has a long pedigree as a mechanism for inhibiting the exercise 
of power.92 Though it may seem like an arbitrary imposition of costs, in 
practical effect it imposes a tax, in the form of administrative 
paperwork, on certain types of actions, ensuring that they will only be 
taken if the benefit exceeds the cost of the tax. Because mutual funds 
have more information and ability to calculate the benefits of action 
than do regulators, such a tax could be an appropriate compromise 
mechanism to disrupt their voice without eliminating it for matters on 
which all funds have similar interests. 
There might be other ways to ensure that the managers of 
individual funds within a family pursue each fund’s best interest when 
it comes to stewardship, whether that means coordinating with the 
other funds in the family or breaking with them. For example, as above, 
mutual fund asset managers charge fees based on the total assets under 
management.93 This is not a performance fee; though fees increase when 
 
92. See Ann M. Lipton, Beyond Internal and External: A Taxonomy of 
Mechanisms for Regulating Corporate Conduct, 2020 Wisc. L. Rev. 657, 
671–77. 
93. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 43, at 2053. 
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asset managers’ stewardship increases the value of the funds, the fees 
also increase or decrease based on investor inflows and outflows. 
Nonetheless, it is common practice for mutual fund families to 
compensate individual portfolio managers—who are in charge of 
handling particular funds—for performance, at least when the fund is 
actively, rather than passively, managed.94 Researchers have found that 
these performance incentives for the portfolio managers have an effect 
on fund performance.95 
Regulators might therefore require that all portfolio managers—
both index and active—receive some performance compensation based 
on increases to the value of the portfolio, as well as requiring that each 
fund manager be given the freedom to coordinate, or not, with the other 
funds in the family when engaged in voting and stewardship activities. 
Fund managers might also be given freedom to decide whether the 
stocks in their funds would be available for lending to short sellers—
which might generate fees for the fund—or whether instead they would 
remain in the portfolio, where they would be available for voting on 
particular matters.96 With this kind of framework, families would still 
be able to leverage their power through the use of common research 
and resources that serve all of their funds,97 and in many cases, portfolio 
managers might choose to cooperate with each other in order to benefit 
from the increased influence that coordination brings. But managers 
might also have incentives to defect from the family on particular 
occasions, which would disrupt the more troubling aspects of mutual 
fund families’ power, while ensuring that funds’ differing interests 
would be respected. 
Conclusion 
At the end of the day, the problem may be that we have put too 
much public responsibility on private actors. In addition to expecting 
mutual funds to fund retirement in a manner that, in other countries, 
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96. Edwin Hu, Joshua Mitts & Haley Sylvester, The Index-Fund Dilemma: An 
Empirical Study of the Lending-Voting Tradeoff 2 (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Rsch. 
Paper No. 20-52; Colum. L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 647, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3673531 [https://pe 
rma.cc/MY3R-3MW7]. It may be difficult to give portfolio managers 
discretion over share lending, however, because fees depend on the number 
of shares available, which in turn may require centralized decisionmaking 
at the family level. 
97. See Lipton, supra note 56, at 200–01. 
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might be a governmental responsibility, we increasingly rely on 
institutional investors to do the work of policing corporate misbehavior. 
Certainly, the exhortations for mutual funds to use their investment 
dollars to combat climate change,98 structural racism,99 corporate 
political spending,100 gun violence,101 and sexual orientation discrim–
ination,102 gives the impression that mutual funds are being tasked with 
governmental responsibilities. They cannot both have that power, and 
not have it; eventually, a choice will have to be made. 
To some extent, the largest mutual funds may eventually make the 
choice themselves; as this Article goes to press, BlackRock announced 
that it was exploring a program by which investors in its funds would 
have the option to choose how their proportionate share of the fund 
would vote.103 Depending on how this program is implemented and the 
number of investors who accept the invitation, BlackRock’s influence 
on corporate governance could be significantly muted, with power 





98. Alastair Marsh & Saijel Kishan, BlackRock, Vanguard Fall Short on 
Climate Voting, Report Says, Bloomberg (Sept. 22, 2020, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-22/blackrock-vanguar 
d-fall-short-on-climate-voting-report-says [https://perma.cc/4VP3-3XMN]. 
99. Evie Liu, Shareholders Tried to Combat Racial Inequality Through 48 
Resolutions This Year. Here’s How Fund Companies Voted., Barron’s 
(Nov. 18, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/how-fund-
companies-voted-on-48-racial-inequality-resolutions-this-year-51605695401 
[https://perma.cc/UW77-4Z63]. 
100. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional 
Investors to Prevent the Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’ Savings 
for Corporate Political Spending (Univ. Pa. L. Sch., Inst. for Law & Econ., 
Rsch. Paper No. 19-03, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3304611 [https://perma.cc/52T7-ZDN5]. 
101. Annie Massa, Larry Fink Confronted by Anti-Gun Protesters at Yahoo 
Summit, Bloomberg (Sept. 20, 2018, 11:08 AM), https://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/articles/2018-09-20/larry-fink-confronted-by-anti-gun-protesters 
-at-yahoo-summit [https://perma.cc/D5YS-6QV7]. 
102. Greg Ryan, Boston Firm Scolds BlackRock Over Proxy Votes on Gay 
Policies, Bos. Bus. J. (Oct. 9, 2016), https://www.bizjournals.com/ 
boston/news/2016/10/19/boston-firm-scolds-blackrock-over-proxy-voteson 
.html [https://perma.cc/X4GV-55LP]. 
103. Mark McCombe, Salim Ramji, & Sandy Boss, Working to Expand Proxy 
Voting Choice for Our Clients, BlackRock, https://www.blackrock.com/ 
corporate/about-us/investment-stewardship/proxy-voting-choice [https:// 
perma.cc/7XHP-QND6] (last visited Oct. 7, 2021). 
